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Hooker's Ideal Code and the Sacrifice Problem 
A common way of arguing against consequentialism is by a reductio ad 
absurdum, highlighting the fact that, in certain situations, we would be 
able to maximize well-being by sacrificing or scapegoating an innocent 
individual. In McCloskey's example, for example, the sheriff of a town 
frames and executes an innocent man in order to appease an angry mob 
that is demanding justice.' The objection states that the consequentialist 
is committed to the claim that this is what the sheriff ought to do. The 
critic then claims that it is not plausible that the correct moral theory 
could demand the sacrifice of innocent individuals in this way, and there- 
fore consequentialism should be rejected. 
For the sake of brevity, I will refer to this as the sacrifice problem. 
Although some consequentialists (most notably J.J.C. smart2) may be 
willing to embrace the apparent reductio, thereby denying there is a prob- 
lem, most consequentialists have seen it as a problem, and have been 
keen to avoid it.3 
On the face of it, Brad Hooker's distribution-sensitive rule-conse- 
quentialism, defended in his Ideal Code, Real World, would seem to 
have the apparatus necessary to avoid the sacrifice problem. Life will go 
better if people don't steal from each other, and if they refrain from kill- 
ing innocent people. Therefore, Hooker's rule-consequentialism will pro- 
tect people from such behavior by conferring to them the necessary 
rights. 
5 will demonstrate, however, that Hooker's rule-consequentialism 
may still require the sacrifice of innocent people in certain situations, and 
therefore remains prone to the sacrifice problem. 
Hooker defends the following principle: 
'J.J.c. Smart, "An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics," in J.J.C. Smart and 
Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1973), chap. 10, p. 69. 
'smart, "Outline," pp. 67-73. 
3 ~ e e  Bernard Williams, Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 
pp. 94-95. 
O Copyright 2004 by Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 30, No. 4 (October 2004) 
584 Rob Lawlor 
An act is wrong if and only if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by 
the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each new generation has maxi- 
mum expected value in terms of well-being (with some priority to the worst ofQ4 
Generally, it is thought that consequentialist theories are prone to the 
sacrifice problem because of their "indifference to di~tribution."~ 
Hooker's Ideal Code, however, is not indifferent to distribution. Rather, 
it gives priority to the worst off, and to that extent is distribution- 
sensitive. 
It must be recognized, however, that it is not necessarily only the 
rights of the worst off that need protection. Thus, giving priority to the 
worst off may not be sufficient to avoid the sacrifice problem. 
G.A. Cohen considers a situation in which eye transplants are easy 
and safe, and the state therefore "conscribe[s] potential eye donors into a 
lottery whose losers must yield an eye to beneficiaries who would other- 
wise be not one-eyed but blind."6 
It is not clear what we should be giving weight to if we want to avoid 
a moral theory that will advocate such a 1otte1-y.~ Giving greater weight to 
the worst off, for example, would give us a theory that would require the 
implementation of this lottery, for who is worse off, in terms of eyes, 
than the blind? 
Similarly, if we give weight to equality, this will support the case for 
the eye lottery, rather than count against it. In addition, we will also be 
faced with the levelling-down objection, such that there would be a case 
for removing the eyes of the sighted, even when transplants are not pos- 
sible.* 
Of course, it is possible that the consequentialist may not be worried 
by the eye lottery. Derek Parfit, for example, claims that we are mistaken 
if we consider a distribution of eyes horrific, and believes that a non- 
voluntary redistribution of eyes can be j~s t i f i ed .~  Although more tenta- 
tive on this issue, Hooker too has suggested that he might be willing to 
adep t  this conclusion, and suggests that a distribution of eyes is only 
4 ~ r a d  Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), p. 32. 
'see William H. Shaw, Contenzporary Ethics, Taking Account of Utilitarianisnr (Ox- 
ford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p. 129. 
6 ~ . ~ .  Cohen, Self-ownership, Freedom, and E q u a l i ~  (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- 
versity Press, 1995), p. 70. See also Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1974), p. 206. 
'of course, the consequentialist may not want to avoid the lottery. This option will be 
considered later in the essay. 
' ~ e r e k  Parfit, "Equality and Priority," in Andrew Mason (ed.), Ideals of E q u a l i ~  
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), chap. 1, p. 10. See also Hooker, Ideal Code, Real 
World, p. 45. 
'parfit, "Equality and Priority," p. 9. 
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different in degree from a distribution of wealth.'' 
Even if we do not agree with Parfit here, this raises an important 
point. The consequentialist does not need to avoid sacrifices completely 
in order to avoid the objection. Those who are not willing to accept the 
conclusions of some forms of consequentialism" may nevertheless em- 
brace those that I have suggested will follow from Hooker's theory. So 
the objection is not simply that consequentialism requires us to sacrifice 
the innocent. Rather, the objection is that consequentialism requires the 
unacceptable sacrifice of the innocent. 
In response to this fact, I add the following two comments. First, I do 
not intend my arguments here to be an out-and-out refutation of rule- 
consequentialism. I intend only to highlight some of the implications of 
rule-consequentialism, which many consider to be more attractive and 
palatable than other forms of consequentialism, and to urge people to 
reconsider whether or not they still consider it an acceptable moral the- 
ory. 
Second, if one is not put off by the eye lottery, I can raise the stakes. 
Suppose we could prolong the lives of many who would otherwise die 
young, having never had the chance to fulfill any of their ambitions, by 
taking essential resources (hearts, livers, kidneys) from people who, al- 
though healthy, had already lived a relatively long and fulfilled life. It 
seems that the distribution-sensitive rule-consequentialist will be com- 
mitted to the organ lottery as well as to the eye lottery-even though the 
redistribution will cost the "donor" his life.12 
Brad Hooker argues that the best (and perhaps the only) response to 
these arguments would be to compare two rules.13 On the one hand, we 
consider a rule that grants people rights that protect their body parts and 
therefore make a redistribution of body parts impermissible. On the other 
hand, we consider a rule that requires the distribution of body parts, with 
a lottery to choose the donors. 
The question then is, which of these rules would actually have the 
best (weighted) consequences? On the basis of the arguments presented 
above, it may seem that this cost-benefit analysis will clearly favor the 
first rule. Eyes, and other body parts, would go to those people who 
really need them. People who would otherwise live half-lives or quarter- 
lived4 might be able to live something closer to a full life, and the blind 
would be given sight. There would also be the additional "advantage that 
''Brad Hooker, personal correspondence. 
11 See Williams, Morality, pp. 94-95, and Smart, "Outline," pp. 67-73. 
I2~ozick,  Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 206. 
l3Brad Hooker, personal correspondence. 
141 take these phrases from Ted Honderich, After the Terror (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2002), pp. 12 and 16. 
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people will feel assured that, should they need a body part, there will be 
one available for them."15 
However, we must also acknowledge that there would be great costs 
associated with this rule. And it must be stressed that this cost is not lim- 
ited to the cost to those who are required to give up various body parts. 
There is, of course, also the significant unease that healthy people will 
feel if such rules were introduced, as well as the cost of internalizing 
these rules.16 
In the light of these considerations, it does seem reasonable to claim 
that the rule-consequentialist would in fact favor the rule that grants peo- 
ple rights that protect their body parts. We might conclude, therefore, 
that rule-consequentialism is able to avoid the sacrifice problem. 
Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced. First, I am not one hundred per- 
cent convinced that this cost-benefit analysis would favor the first rule. 
That is not to say that I think the cost analysis would favor the second 
rule. I simply think it is unclear what the result of the cost-benefit analy- 
sis would be. 
Second, we might want to consider other rules. There might be other 
ways to redistribute body parts that reduce the amount of unease. Instead 
of holding a lottery, as in the original suggestion, we might pick out a 
small group of people and make them the donors, such that the rest of us 
could feel secure in the knowledge that our organs will not be taken from 
us. We might "breed" people especially for this purpose. 
In the original rule, we had to consider the considerable amount of 
unease felt by everyone. But by picking on a choice few, this unease 
could be reduced considerably. Of course, the unhappiness of those se- 
lect few-taken individually-would be much greater than the unease of 
the others-taken individually-but in terms of aggregate unhappiness 
and dissatisfaction, this policy may ultimately result in a reduction of 
unhappiness. 
,In response to this, Hooker can point out that his version of rule- 
consequentialism is distribution-sensitive and gives weight to the worst 
off, and this would count against such an unjust policy. This is true, but 
would these people be the worst off? They may still be better off than the 
blind and the terminally ill. They may still live relatively full lives- 
especially if, for example, we had a policy of not taking organs from 
these donors until after they had reached a certain age. Thus, although 
the suffering of the donors would be given extra weight, even more 
weight would have to be given to the well-being of the blind and the 
sick, and thus the rule-consequentialist might conclude that these policies 
" ~ r a d  Hooker, personal correspondence. 
16~gain ,  I owe this point to Brad Hooker. 
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should be implemented. 
I concede that my argument is far from conclusive, but again, at the 
very least, it seems unclear which way the cost-benefit analysis would 
go. In addition, this discussion also illustrates a further point: it looks as 
if there is something wrong with this approach, whichever rule the cost- 
benefit analysis favors. As Hooker concedes, 
the very idea of running a cost-benefit analysis on a rule about taking body parts and 
redistributing them will strike many people as inherently counter-intuitive, no matter 
what the outcome of that cost-benefit analysis is.17 
Consequently, even if the cost-benefit analysis does favor the rule grant- 
ing rights to protect people from eye lotteries, those who find Hooker's 
arguments appealing may nevertheless find that they have a conflict be- 
tween two intuitions. 
On the one hand, they will have the intuition that rule-consequen- 
tialism "does a better job than its rivals of matching and tying together 
our moral convictions, as well as offering us help with our moral dis- 
agreements and uncertainties."18 On the other hand, though, they may 
also have the intuition that we should not have to do a cost-benefit analy- 
sis in order to conclude that the redistribution of organs and the breeding 
of donors are not permissible.1g 
Rob Lawlor 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Reading 
r.s.lawlor@reading.ac.uk 
" ~ r a d  Hooker, personal correspondence. 
18 Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, p. 101. 
''1 owe thanks to Brad Hooker for reading and commenting on previous drafts of this 
paper. The latter part of the paper in particular benefited immeasurably from his com- 
ments and contribution. 
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